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ABSTRACT
In contrast to most Western countries, routine offer of
prenatal screening is considered problematic in the
Netherlands. The main argument against offering it to
every pregnant woman is that women would be brought
into a moral dilemma when deciding whether to use
screening or not. This paper explores whether the active
offer of a prenatal screening test indeed confronts women
with a moral dilemma. A qualitative study was developed,
based on a randomised controlled trial that aimed to
assess the decision-making process of women when
confronted with a test offer. A sample of 59 women was
interviewed about the different factors balanced in
decision-making. Participants felt themselves caught
between a need for knowledge and their unwillingness to
take on responsibility. Conflict was reported between
wishes, preferences and ethical views regarding parent-
hood; however, women did not seem to be caught in a
choice between two or more ethical principles.
Participants balanced the interests of the family against
that of the fetus in line with their values and their personal
circumstances. Therefore, we conclude that they are not
so much faced with an ethical dilemma as conflicting
interests. We propose that caregivers should provide the
opportunity for the woman to discuss her wishes and
doubts to facilitate her decision. This approach would help
women to assess the meaning of testing within their
parental duties towards their unborn child and their
current offspring.
Although prenatal screening for Down syndrome
and neural-tube defects has become routine pre-
natal care in most western countries, health policy
in the Netherlands has been reluctant to offer
screening to all pregnant women. At the time this
study was performed (2002–2004) only women in
high-risk categories, of advanced maternal age
(from 36 years old) or with medical indications,
were offered invasive testing. Active offering of
screening tests to women with a low risk was
forbidden; the test could be performed only on
request.1
One of the main reasons for the Dutch govern-
ment to limit prenatal screening is that an
unsolicited offer would bring women into a moral
dilemma when considering whether or not to have
the test performed.2 This dilemma can be sketched
as follows: because there is no therapy available,
women receiving abnormal results would be forced
to make a choice between two equally binding and
mutually exclusive ethical principles, namely the
moral duties of ‘‘respecting the life of the unborn’’
and ‘‘avoidance of suffering’’. These two principles
support two incompatible options: bringing the
pregnancy to term (implying direct responsibility
for the suffering of a disabled child), or opting for
termination and therefore violating the right to life
of the fetus. The impossibility of foreseeing either
the degree of suffering or the consequences of a
particular disability makes it difficult to determine
which is the best choice from a moral perspective.3–6
For their part, proponents of routine offering of
prenatal screening claim the right of the parents to
be informed about all existing test to make
autonomous and well-considered decisions.7
This discussion in the Netherlands indicates a
need for more research about the issues involved in
routine offering of prenatal screening. Many
studies have been performed on the decision-
making involved in prenatal testing.8–16 From these
studies, it seems that women experience difficulty
in determining what is the best choice.17–20 In this
paper we analyse whether this difficulty should be
considered as an ethical dilemma. Although the
Dutch policy changed in January 2007, so that
women with low risk have to be informed about
the possibility of screening, the study we per-
formed was carried out in 2002–2004, and thus we
made use of an unique opportunity to study the
effect of an active test offer on women’s decision-
making in a context where prenatal screening was
not routine, but rather part of a randomised
controlled trial (RCT). The RCT consisted of three
different groups: (1) one receiving the offering of a
maternal serum test (MST), (2) one receiving the
offering of a nuchal translucency measurement
(NTM) and (3) a control group.12 21
A qualitative study was developed on the basis
of the RCT to obtain more insight into the effect
of ethical beliefs on decision making. This paper
reflects the results of the qualitative study. We
explored the effect of a test offer on the decisional
process and the various factors women balanced
when deciding whether or not to accept the
offer.22 23
METHODS
A special permit for explicitly offering prenatal
screening was granted by the Minister of Health
and by the Medical Ethics Committee of the VU
University Medical Centre.
Participants
Participants of the RCT who were in the process of
deciding about the test were randomly selected and
asked by phone to participate in an interview.
Participants were randomly selected and asked to
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make an appointment within a week after the test was offered
and before the test would eventually performed. In total 59
women agreed to be interviewed (26 from the MST group and
33 from the NTM group). As we were investigating here only
the effect of the test offer, we did not include participants from
the control group. Participants of the control group would have
needed to be fully informed about the possibility of testing,
thereby breaking the protocol of the RCT.
Interviews
Semi-structured interviews were chosen to make it possible for
the participants to explain their own experience about the test
offer and to allow a deeper insight into the women’s
motivations for their choice. The interviews lasted approxi-
mately 1 hour, and were conducted at the participant’s home
(by EG and other professional interviewers with the VUMC).
With the participant’s permission, all interviews were recorded
and transcribed. To guarantee anonymity, each woman was
allocated a number code.
Interviews started with open-ended questions about the
woman’s reasons for accepting of declining the test. To explore
the various factors involved in the decision we included
questions about the woman’s reasons for her decision and her
feelings regarding her choice. Subsequently, we extended the
discussion to the participants’ ethical views about issues relating
to prenatal testing, ie, parental duties toward the unborn and
current offspring; the worth of a disabled life, the acceptability
of controlling the offspring’s characteristics, the status of the
fetus, and the permissibility of termination in general and for
Down syndrome in particular.24–27 The interview questions were
assessed for their intelligibility after performing the five first
interviews, and it was considered that no adaptation was
needed.
Data analysis
The womrn’s views regarding testing and thier reasons for her
decision were analysed with Nudist-Vivo (N-Vivo) software
V.2.0 (QSR Software, Durham, UK). Segments of the interview
were coded, and codes were then grouped together into key
themes. Analysis delivered nine categories according systematic
ordering of the themes (different views) that emerged from the
responses.22 Within these categories conflicting views were
found. For the purposes of this paper further analyses were
aimed at identifying the themes related to the conflicts
mentioned by participants. Based on these analyses three topics
were identified: (1) parental duties, (2) the woman’s needs and
wishes and (3) the woman’s ethical principles.
RESULTS
The results identify the conflicting aspects reported.
‘Participants’ indicates the whole study group. Where state-
ments are quoted, the woman’s code number, group, and
whether she had decided to accept (acceptor) or decline
(decliner) the test are given. The findings from the two
intervention groups are presented together. From the RCT no
differences were found in views between participants in the
NTM and MST groups.12
Parental duties
Towards the unborn
Participants agreed that parents have a duty to look for the
health and wellbeing of their unborn child. This duty was not
linked to the use of prenatal testing, nor to the prevention of
disability. Participants limited their responsibility to the
avoidance of actions that might have a negative influence on
the health of the fetus, such as smoking or drinking alcohol.
Reasons for not including testing as a parental obligation
included that the screening does not give sufficient information
for further decisions and the awareness that testing does not
guarantee a completely healthy life for the child.
‘‘Actually, everybody wants a healthy child. But there are so
many things that can go wrong! You never have a guarantee that
everything is good also when you do all those tests.’’ (060900-79;
NTM, decliner)
Acceptors and decliners differed in their view about the
significance of testing within their duties towards their unborn
child. Although none of the acceptors aimed to avoid a child
with Down syndrome, they used the screening to guarantee the
health of the fetus. At the same time, acceptors reported their
unwillingness to take further decisions because of the difficulty
in assessing which level of suffering should be prevented in the
interest of the child.
‘‘How can you find out what is good for the child? To what
degree does such a child realise that he has a disability? I find this
quite difficult. My brother is deaf. For others it is awful, but he
does not know it can be different, he has always been deaf. He
has done very well in his life; he has a family, two healthy
children. You could have decided that he should not be born,
while he is very happy’’. (060900-68; MST, acceptor)
Decliners considered avoiding unnecessary risks as the best
action in the interest of the child. Important reasons given were
the ambiguity of the screening results and the risks of invasive
testing. At the same time, decliners questioned whether they
had to use the test in the interest of their future child.
‘‘I think that disabled children have many qualities that can be
stimulated. On the other hand, which future does such a child
have? Well, this is quite problematic. The child may suffer, so are
you not selfish if you allow him to be born? That is a very
difficult issue’’.(K07811-22; MST, decliner)
Towards their other children
Participants reported the effect of a disabled child on their
family as important in their decision about screening. Both
acceptors and decliners indicated that they would make another
choice if their personal and familiar circumstances were
different.
In the case of a disability that might be compatible with a
reasonably good life, participants questioned to what extent
family interests should weigh against the life of the unborn.
Disability was not always entirely considered without value.
Participants mentioned that a disabled child might have a
positive effect on the family. In spite of this opinion, they
concerned about the burdens that their family could face when
a disabled child is born.
‘‘I think you can learn a great deal from these situations. That in
life sometimes things happen through which you become more
aware that little things mean a lot. But I feel some pressure,
because of the impact on my family. This is quite difficult.’’
(K18811-89; MST, acceptor)
A difference between acceptors and decliners was found in
the extent to which they thought that raising a disabled child
would impede them in fulfilling their parental responsibilities
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towards their other children. Acceptors feared that they would
be unable to give enough attention to their family because of
the extra care a disabled child would require.
‘‘You never know how your life will be. But this is one of the
things you can know beforehand. I am very happy with my life; I
have a daughter who is 1 year old. It is very important for me
that my children are happy and this would be very difficult with
a child with Down syndrome because it will need extra
care.’’(K03400-7; NTM, acceptor)
For decliners, a reason against testing was their perceived
capacity to deal with a disabled child and the care for other
children. At the same time, they were aware of the extra care
that a child with Down syndrome needs and questioned
whether declining the test would not be against their
responsibilities towards their family.
For me this child is number two. A child with Down syndrome
should require extra care. Perhaps that will be a reason for me to
terminate my pregnancy because my child would get less
attention. A child with Down syndrome would be prejudicial for
my family.’’ (K07811-52; NTM, decliner)’’
Women’s needs and wishes
Participants made their decision to reduce anxiety during
pregnancy. All of them said they were satisfied with their final
choice, even when they reported that it was not an easy one.
Acceptors chose testing moved by a wish for more knowledge
to avoid the anxiety of wondering if their baby was healthy and
to confirm that everything was good. On the other hand, they
reported reluctance to make further decisions. They postponed
thinking about further options until the screening results were
known.
‘‘I’m sure that I want to take the test. What will I do with the
result? Well I will see. That’s the problem. I do not want to
think. I feel that I want to keep the baby but I also think that I
will terminate.I have doubts about what is the best choice.’’
(K38311-76; NTM, acceptor)
Decliners chose to avoid the uncertainty and anxiety that
might come with the screening. The fear of a miscarriage due to
invasive procedures was reported as not weighing against their
desire for reassurance about the health of the fetus. At the same
time, decliners welcomed information. They admitted they
would consider testing if the screening gave a sure diagnostic.
‘‘It is a chance approximation and this implies you have actually
to perform an extra test. And that test is risk. I think that if I did
not need to do that extra test I would take the screening.’’
(075400-9; NTS, decliner)
Women’s ethical principles
Participants shared the view that parents ought to accept their
children unconditionally. They considered an exception to this
rule is if the child would be severely disabled with a life full of
suffering. In this case, participants agreed that parents have a
duty to decide about the birth of the child based upon the
child’s best interests. Even so, termination was reported to be
morally problematic because it clashes with the right to life of
the child. Participants expressed doubt about the reasons that
would make termination of pregnancy morally acceptable. They
voiced worries that only perfect children may be born in the
future.
‘‘I find abortion acceptable when you honestly do it in the
interest of the child because you cannot care for it and then it
would be unhappy. But there are so many reasons that I find
egoistic. I wonder whether we are like sitting on the chair of God,
in case He exists, that we want to decide about those things. I
think that we are going too far in this feasible world, that we
want everything to be perfect.’’ (K18811-67; NTM, decliner)
Termination of pregnancy in case of disabilities that may be
compatible with a good life was reported as egoistic. Down
syndrome was not assumed to be the kind of suffering that
parents ought to prevent. Nevertheless, participants approved
termination when parents cannot cope with such a child, for
the child would not have the care and love that is needed for a
good life.
‘‘If the parents are convinced they cannot care for the child and
they allow it to be born, that child would not be happy. Neither
would the parents. I fear that the child would be neglected.
Certainly, I disapprove of the parents, but on the other hand I
also think that it is not good for the child to be born with parents
who do not want it.’’ (K03711-01; MST, decliner).
One of the main reasons decliners gave for not testing was
that termination would be morally wrong in their personal
circumstances. At the same time, decliners reported their
difficulty to know in what cases termination would be a good
option looking to the interest of the child.
‘‘Actually, you think in terms of quality of life. Is it severely
disabled or is it a child who should have a good life, also if it has
limitations? I find it very difficult to know what the best decision
is. Neither do I know what the boundaries are.’’ (K18811-77;
MST, decliner)
DISCUSSION
In this paper we explored the effect of an active offer of a
prenatal screening test in a context where testing is not normal
part of prenatal care. In contrast to studies that maintain that
information facilitates women in making well-considered
decisions, participants described the choice as difficult to make
because of the implications of the test results not only for the
future child, but also for their family and ultimately for
themselves. Although they were positive about their choice,
participants mentioned they found themselves caught between
a desire for information and reassurance about the health of the
fetus and their fear of making difficult decisions about their
unborn child. They were concerned as to what degree family
and personal wellbeing may be weighed against the right to life
of the fetus. The main question at this point is whether this
difficulty can be defined as a genuine ethical dilemma.
A moral dilemma occurs when an agent has valid moral
reasons to support two or more exclusive actions, at least one of
which they are required to do. These reasons involve moral
principles that are equally strong and values that are equally
central to the life of the agent. Participants claimed their right to
freely decide whether they want to use testing according to
their assessment of the usefulness of the test in their individual
and family circumstances. Closely related to this is the physical
and emotional burden they expected from a disabled child on
their family life. Down syndrome in itself was reported as a
morally insufficient reason for termination. Nevertheless,
participants judged termination as morally acceptable when
parents cannot cope with the effect of such a child on their
personal and family life. At the same time, participants voiced
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ethical concerns about selection of ‘‘perfect’’ children and
questioned what would constitute a sufficiently serious
disability to justify termination. All of them were reluctant to
consider having a termination themselves. These results suggest
that women’s preferences about testing often deviate from their
ethical values.
Based on these results, we believe that women to whom
testing is offered are confronted with a decision about what
interests, preferences or needs would be given priority and not
about two or more ethical principles they are compelled to
follow. Therefore, we cannot define it as a genuine moral
dilemma. Our results indicate that the possibility of testing
generates a wish for extra information. At the same time,
women fear the consequences of testing. Participants decided by
balancing the interest of the fetus against their individual
wishes and the family needs to find the option that was most in
line with their values. The conflict that women reported could
be interpreted as the difficulty of assessing the usefulness of the
screening to their personal situation. Although participants
embraced their decision, they also reported that they would
decide differently in other circumstances.
Our findings also suggest the existence of a gap between
ethical decisions in practice and those based on ethical theory
regarding the possibility of moral dilemmas. Anderson claims
that moral dilemmas are only possible within the Kantian
approach of ethics in which personal and moral matters are
separated and in which moral principles are universal expressions
of our moral duties.28 This entails that the decision about what is
right and what is wrong is reduced to the rational application of
ethical principles and norms. According to this approach, conflicts
between principles must be rationally resolved by consulting a
higher-level principle. When different ethical principles are both
equally relevant to apply, an agent is caught in a situation in
which there is no way to determine which choice is morally right
for the particular situation.29–31 In this way, ethical decisions are
reduced to technical decisions undermining the importance of the
individual desires, preferences, circumstances and the possible
consequences, in the decision-making.
However, as our results show, a rational and purely abstract
analysis of the factors involved without taking into considera-
tion the concrete persons who are embodied or implicated in the
decision regarding testing is unlikely to capture the emotional
and circumstantial concerns in which decisions are made.
Furthermore, rational analyses of normative decisions often fail
to take into consideration agent’s values and desires, which are
difficult to quantify.32 33
This suggests a clear need for a new ethical framework of
thinking in reproductive decisions. The neo-Aristotelian ethical
approach might be a promising alternative for identifying the
nature of the conflicts that women reported when deciding
about testing. This framework of ethical thinking assumes that
the morality of an action varies with the circumstances of each
particular occasion. Within this approach, an action is morally
right only if it is what a virtuous person would do in the same
circumstances. The central question when deciding about
testing is not ‘‘is the action against any ethical principle?’’ or
‘‘does it harm anyone?’’ but rather ‘‘what would a good parent
do in these circumstances?’’. Two fundamental characteristics
of good parenthood are accepting children as they are and
safeguarding the children’s wellbeing and happiness.
Parenthood is at the same time a self-directed project. In
deciding about testing, women are compelled to determine the
effect of knowledge about the fetus in their acceptance and
pursuit of the wellbeing of their children and in their own
interest. The individual concept of a good life and the
consequences of their choice in the short and long term play a
central role in defining their decision.
This study was developed in a context where there was no
routine screening on offer. Despite this, our findings may also
have implications for countries where testing is a standard
procedure. As Suter suggests, the offer of testing might be
regarded as self-evident and women would be likely to
participate automatically without considering its ethical impli-
cations.34 Moreover, women might believe that they are morally
compelled to use testing in the interest of their child and family.
In the light of these results, we believe that addressing the
nature of the conflict women experience when deciding about
testing needs to be carefully analysed before new screening tests
are offered to a general, low-risk population. We propose that
routine offering of prenatal screening and testing is ethically
justified when the offer is accompanied by broad-based
counselling. As counselling aims to assist women to choose
the course of action most appropriate to them in view of their
goals and according to the ethical values they hold, identifying
this conflict should help caregivers to discern whether women
make their decisions under pressure from needs, wishes and
additional duties that might be triggered by the test offer and
therefore not in the line with their ethical values.
To help women to assess the meaning of testing within their
parental duties, counselling should include discussion of the
effect of the woman’s wishes and preferences regarding testing,
her familiar context-bounded needs and her ethical values.
Caregivers should ensure that women understand the advan-
tages and disadvantages of testing and the scenarios they might
face in case of a bad test result. Furthermore, all options,
including that of not testing should be presented. Some
practical points that may be discussed are: the women’s
thoughts about life with a child with Down syndrome; what
they want to do with the information once they have t it (that
is, whether they want to take further tests and whether
termination would be an option) and whether they would
prefer to be confronted with a disabled child at the time of birth
or to prepare themselves and their family beforehand.
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